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Joint Warfighting Without Joint Bureaucracy


by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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**Abstract of
JOINT WARFIGHTING WITHOUT JOINT BUREAUCRACY**

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The paper supports the use of the JTCB as an operational level advisory board for the JFC and the JFACC for the direction of joint fires. The paper recommends against the use of the JFFC.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Thesis. Evolving joint doctrine is designing a system of joint targeting and allocation organizations. These organizations may generate excess levels of checks and balances which risk significantly delaying the targeting cycle. This paper discusses the organizations while emphasizing the implications for the operational commander. Specific issues are:

- a. the valid, competing demands on limited warfighting resources represented by these organizations.
- b. the strengths and limitations each organization brings to the targeting and allocation cycle.
- c. Considerations for the operational commander to streamline targeting and allocation decisions.

Overview. This paper is written at the Joint Task Force (JTF) level where the JTF has been established as a crisis response. A JTF is normally established for a specific mission of limited duration. The staff and forces may have some experience together, but generally are not a standing organization. The CJTF, as the Joint Force Commander (JFC), must resolve the competing interests of the Unified CINC and his warfighting components to design his own battle plans. The JFC is charged with the effective and efficient conduct of joint operations. Joint doctrine should enhance this task, but instead is developing a counterproductive bureaucracy.

Doctrine for three joint organizations is under development to resolve the competing demands of a joint force. Current Joint Pubs have not reached concurrence on the roles of these organizations. Use of all three organizations simultaneously is a duplication of effort and will deteriorate the unity of effort. The contentious organizations are summarized below:

a. Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB). The JTCB is an advisory panel of key JFC staff members and a senior representative from each warfighting component. The board focuses on the JFC's campaign plan several days in advance.¹ No Joint Pub is under development to specifically address the JTCB. Evolving doctrine is available in Joint Pub 3-0 (Joint Warfighting Concepts), 3-09 (Fire Support) and 3-56.1 (Command and Control for Joint Air Operations).

b. Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC). The JFACC is a functional commander with the operational authority to plan, allocate, task and execute those sorties apportioned by the JFC. The JFACC has a joint staff with personnel from each component and warfare expertise.² Doctrine for JFACC is being developed in Joint Pub 3-56.1.

c. Joint Force Fires Coordinator (JFFC). "The JFFC coordinates the development of a joint fires plan to support the JFC's campaign plan."³ Doctrine for the JFFC is being developed in Joint Pub 3-09.

Figure 1 presents the relationship of the JTCB, JFACC and JFFC in a notional JTF organization. Current, incomplete doctrine gives these three organizations competing roles in the employment of joint fires. Joint fires are the combination of

the JFACC, the JFC-J3 and/or a Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC).


CHAPTER II

Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB)

Targeting must occur at all levels, from the NCA to the trigger-puller. The Joint Targeting Coordination Board is a JFC-level forum created to 'level the playing field' for each warfighting component. Its function is to recommend the "coordination, integration and prioritization of joint force requirements. This includes the identification and prioritization of resources for target acquisition and battle damage collection. The effort should ensure that required target effects are achieved for all the components (consistent with JFC prioritization)." ⁵ Figure 2 depicts the composition of a JFC's JTCB.⁶

Figure 2

Joint Targeting Coordination Board



The JFC may designate a Joint Force Fires Coordinator, ARFOR is designated for illustration.
The JFC may designate a Joint Forces Air Component Commander, AFFOR is designated for illustration.

The composition shown above is not prescribed by joint doctrine. It has been successfully used in exercises OCEAN VENTURE and TANDUM THRUST to train forces on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The JTCB may be headed by the Deputy JFC, the JFC-J3 or a component commander. The members are senior representatives from the warfighting components.

Advantages. The seniority of membership ensures that each component understands the JFC's campaign plan. It is an opportunity to review the progress of the campaign timing. The components ensure that the phase termination criteria will be met based on the JFC's priorities. The JTCB is a macro-level review focused on major units and targets to be certain that the JFC's campaign objectives are met. The greatest advantage of the JTCB is the understanding of the JFC's intent and the application of that intent to mid/long range planning.

Each warfighting component has valid mission requirements which must be accomplished for a given phase of the campaign. This small, senior advisory panel reviews the combined effects of the campaign to date. Representation by all components allows the JTCB to make recommendations to the JFC on supplemental ROE and no-hit targets to maximize the effects of joint fires.

The JTCB includes the JFC-J2 who heads the Collection Review Board (CRB). The CRB will prioritize and task the joint force collection effort. As a member of the JTCB, the J2's awareness of planned operations and their priority provides for the best combination of pre-strike and post-strike coverage. This maximizes the chances for target acquisition and informed BDA development.

Disadvantages. The JTCB has the potential to significantly delay allocation and therefore allotment of joint fires. At issue is the whether the JTCB has directive and/or veto authority in the targeting and allocation process. The seniority of this board provides a 'level playing field' for debate of component priorities and contributions to the campaign plan. Consent for the allocation of limited assets is

difficult on this leveled field. Jomini's caution on the general staff concept applies directly to the JTCB: "The greater the number and higher the rank of the military officers who compose the council, the more difficult will it be to accomplish the triumph of truth and reason, however small be the amount of dissent." ⁷

The second difficulty with the JTCB is the associated administrative burden. The daily briefings are prepared by the JFC-J2, J3 and J5 personnel with extensive inputs from each of the component commands. The level of detail required for the JTCB to be effective represents a significant duplication of effort.

CHAPTER III

Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)


The JFC designates a JFACC when two or more components provide aircraft or tactical standoff missiles to the joint operation. The JFACC exercises OPCON over those forces and missions apportioned by the JFC. The JFACC will normally be the component commander with the preponderance of air assets and the best Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C⁴I) to direct joint operations. This functional commander controls all air forces and cruise missile missions not specifically restricted by the JFC. ⁸

It is important to present the organization of the JFACC staff to understand its role in the direction of joint fires. The staff organization shown in figure 3 is taken from the current USCINCLANT/USCINCPAC JFACC Concept of Operations and is consistent with the evolution of the JFACC concept in the other AORs. Combat Plans has service experts for each platform in the joint force. The Plans Division is responsible for determining the best mix of target and strike weapon. Combat Ops executes the current day's joint air effort. Operations manning includes the service expertise necessary to make changes to the plan on execution day. ⁹

The Army's Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) provides an example of integrating service experts to the JFACC staff. The BCE "synchronizes the ARFOR scheme of maneuver with the air campaign through coordination of tactical air support and the exchange of operations and intelligence data." ¹⁰ This twenty eight

Figure 3

Joint Force Air Component Commander



man team is spread through Plans, Ops and Intel to present the ARFOR's priorities, concerns and fire support control measures. This ensures that the joint fires directed by the JFACC are coordinated with the Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO's) of the ground forces.

Advantages. The majority of joint (indirect) fires in a campaign are provided by aircraft. This is simply a function of their range and speed. Aircraft quickly provide support throughout the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The remaining joint

fires, provided by MLRS, ATACMS, TLAM and SOF, can be integrated to the current JFACC concept.

The JFACC staff has evolved to provide a balance of services at each level. The manning provides for arbitration of issues without delaying allotment of forces. The Deputy JFACC is from a different service than the JFACC commander. The division heads are from different services. The service cells are able to optimize the tactical employment of forces according to service doctrine and training. These service experts work directly for the JFACC in developing the Air Tasking Order (ATO). Finally, each service provides an O-6 liaison officer to support the JFACC. These liaisons are service advocates representing their component commander's views. They ensure that the JFACC understands the service capabilities and requirements and that the component commander understands the JFACC's plan.

Daily ATO development begins with a targeting review board with participants from every warfighting component. This board is known by different names in each AOR. It is called the Combat Operations Planning Staff (COPS) in CENTCOM; the Guidance, Apportionment & Tasking (GAT) in LANTCOM; and the JFACC Targeting Board (JTB) in PACOM. The important advantage shared by these boards is the timely and detailed analysis. The board reviews the JFC's phase objectives, ROE, missed sorties, current intelligence projections and the recommendations of each service component. The meeting is timed to allow the board results to drive the allotment of forces against priority targets.

The JFACC concept is applicable regardless of the service component selected for the task. At the low end, the Navy can control 200-250 sorties daily as the JFACC-Afloat.¹¹ As the size of the joint force grows, the preponderance of forces will normally be land-based and the JFACC will transition ashore.

The greatest advantage of the JFACC is his authority for execution day changes. The JFACC is an operational commander who understands the JFC's intent and priorities. Combat Ops has the C'I required to process in-flight reports and initial BDA and respond to the changing threat with the best choice of joint fires. This centralized control of joint fires enables the JFACC to respond quickly to the needs of the JFC's campaign.

Disadvantages. The JFACC is a manpower intensive staff. Centralized control requires a large staff to make decisions 36-48 hours before the execution day in order to perform detailed target analysis, weaponeering and scheduling of the joint force. An associated concern is the requirement for a large, robust C'I architecture which must be interoperable throughout the joint force. This issue is improving as each service procures systems compatible with the Contingency TACS Automated Planning System (CTAPS).

The centralized control of the JFACC reduces the planning time available for the Navy flight crews. This is significant to Navy strike planners who are trained to perform target analysis and weaponeering for their target assignments. Under the JFACC concept, many of the details of strike group composition and weaponeering

are determined in the JFACC and then passed to the Carrier Air Wing. This reduces the flexibility and planning available to the Navy strike planners.

The Marine Corps doctrine and training is designed to enhance their effectiveness as a combined arms team (the MAGTF). The JFC must direct the MARFOR to release his air to the JFACC's operational control. This is a significant impact on the MAGTF because the Marines use air power in lieu of artillery for direct support of the maneuver units. The JFC must ensure that support for the MAGTF is provided from the joint force. The JFC must compensate because the JFACC's OPCON of Marine Air is contrary to Marine Corps doctrine and training.

The greatest concern for the JFACC is that it competes with the JTCB and JFFC for the direction of joint fires. This causes component commands to question the impartiality of the JFACC.

CHAPTER IV

Joint Force Fires Coordinator (JFFC)

The JFFC concept remains under development in Joint Pub 3-09. Major functions of the JFFC are the evaluation of the cumulative effects of joint fires and preparation of the JFC's joint fire support estimate.¹² The organizational issue of the JFFC's location is important to understanding its role. Evolving doctrine supports the JFFC as:

- a. a replacement for the JTCB,
- b. a function of the JFC-J3,
- c. a second hat for the ARFOR's Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOOR),
- d. the ground component commander.

Advantages. The JFFC measures the success of the JFC's campaign and recommends future fire support with a focus on ground operations. This ensures that the surface commander controls the effects of fires supporting his maneuver units.

Disadvantages. Development of doctrine for the JFFC has been hampered by the difficulty in clearly defining its function. At the JFC level, a JFFC would duplicate functions of the JFC-J3 and the JTCB. At the ARFOR level, it competes directly with the JTCB and JFACC in the planning of joint fires.

An ARFOR-level JFFC also fails to incorporate the MARFOR fire support plans. A Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) is better suited to present the joint fires concerns of both the ARFOR and MARFOR. This option already exists for the JFC.

The final concern for the JFFC is the lack of consensus for the definition of joint fires. In its purest definition, all combat forces available to the JFC are joint fires and would be under the direction of the JFFC.

CHAPTER V

Operational Considerations

The JFC retains the authority and responsibility to direct the campaign. Key areas of concern are the establishment of target priorities, relative levels of effort and the sequence of events. These will drive the organization of the joint force. In the near term, the joint force organization is likely to be a combination of service and functional components as shown in figure 1. This is driven by the constraints of training as independent services and operating as a joint force. Experience and doctrine for the JFLCC will develop the future option of organizing the joint force along purely functional lines.

The JFC is charged with the efficient conduct of his campaign. The desire to limit the risk to his force demands the use of joint targeting and allocation procedures. His challenge is to avoid establishing a bureaucratic burden in an effort to be efficient.

JFACC. The JFACC is the most efficient organization for joint targeting because it limits the duplication of effort. The detailed planning required for joint air operations directly support the JFC's targeting and apportionment decision process. Changes in the JFACC over the last two years have developed this into a truly joint organization. The mix of service and seniority of the experts provide built-in checks and balances to minimize the risk of service parochialism.

The JFC's decision to activate a JFACC should be documented in the Operations Order (OpOrd). The OpOrd defines the JFACC's authority and responsibility. It sets parameters for sorties exempted from JFACC control. The OpOrd defines the JFACC's autonomy for each phase of the campaign while leaving him the freedom to command the joint air effort.

JTCB. This is a productive organization to support the JFC. It must operate at the operational level and stay focused beyond the ATO planning cycle. It is an excellent forum to translate the JFC campaign and intentions into achievable component missions and tasks.

It is important to remember that the JTCB is an advisory board for the JFC. It operates outside the operational chain-of-command. Its purpose is to coordinate targeting guidance and to anticipate the demands of future operations in the campaign plan. It should not be given the authority to veto operational decisions.

JFEC. This organization appears to be a duplication of effort which should be avoided. Evaluating the cumulative effects of joint fires is required of every component commander and the JFC's J3. Fire support estimates for course of action development are also a JFC J3 function.

The ground commanders have better opportunities to affect the use of joint fires. If a JFACC is established, the BCE with USMC augmentation provides the ground commanders with a timely input to the allotment of joint fires. The JFACC also has a dedicated liaison element which articulates the component commander

issues. The JTCCB provides the 'level playing field' where each component's concerns are presented. Finally, the component commander always has the duty to report directly to the JFC when his joint fire requirements are not adequately supported.

CHAPTER VI

Summary

Joint doctrine is being developed in a variety of publications to resolve limitations in the targeting and allocation of joint forces. The missing element is trust. Emerging organizations are being presented as independent solutions to the JFC's targeting needs. The need for improving the conduct of joint operations is valid, however development of conflicting doctrine does not serve the Joint Force Commander.

The JFC fights a single joint force campaign in which each warfighting component has valid missions and needs. Targeting is, and will remain, a priority at all levels of the joint force. The challenge for the JFC is to establish joint organizations which balance service, seniority and expertise. These organizations will minimize the risk of service parochialism and operate from a joint perspective. This will encourage trust in the employment of joint operations.

The best mix of joint organizations to support the JFC's campaign are the JTCB and JFACC. The JTCB operates at the operational level to advise the JFC. The JFACC, as it has evolved in the last two years, is a proven joint organization which bridges the operational and tactical level.

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